## Séminaire Algorithmique |

Le séminaire a lieu **le mardi à 11 h 45** (sauf modification exceptionnelle), au campus Côte de Nacre, bâtiment Sciences 3, salle S3 351, 3ème étage.

# Résumé du séminaire du Mardi 5 Mars 2013

*Exact and approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion models:
existence and computation*

## par Angelo Fanelli (CREM, Caen)

Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even in games where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed, their computation can be a computationally hard task. Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players. Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which characterize situations where no player can significantly improve her payoff by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution concepts provided that they exist and can be computed efficiently. In this talk, we present recent results and open problems concerning the existence and computation of exact and approximate pure Nash equilibria in the context of congestion models.